If not redirected, China is likely headed towards relative stability
Note: This was written in April 2021 for a Chinese Politics course. This is not completely representative of my views, as I could only use course materials.
In the past 70 years, China has transformed from a poor country emerging from a bloody revolution into the global superpower that is the sole threat to American hegemony. During the tenure of Deng Xiaoping, reform teased at liberalizing China, but ultimately Xi Jinping pushed China back on a track trending towards authoritarianism and nationalism. This may not be permanent, however. The Communist Party has long maintained legitimacy through performance; because there is no democracy at the upper levels of the party, people’s frustrations cannot be taken out in the ballot box. Although the future of China is rather unclear, I believe that China is likely headed towards a stable path given the relative success of Xi’s anti- corruption campaigns and the importance of performance legitimacy to the party. This is, of course, dependent that Xi’s successor will not revert back to reform era-style rule.
Key Trends in Chinese Politics
The most important trend in modern Chinese politics is the shift away from liberal political norms. Xi has been willing to forego many political norms without facing much domestic criticism. For example, it was agreed upon in the reform era that leaders would not use anti-corruption probes to target political rivals (Pei 2019, 152). However, this also meant that there was no practical mechanism to report corruption from within the party, where it was naturally most visible and known. Xi exploited this after his rise to power, purging many officials, some of whom were political rivals. The anti-corruption campaigns allowed him to gather a tremendous amount of public support, in turn allowing him to break another norm in changing term limits. When thinking about Xi’s rejection of liberal political norms in a historical context, one must consider both Mao and Deng. Mao was first a revolutionary who paid no mind to political norms at all, and Deng was willing to revise Mao’s vision to better address the present issues. Therefore Xi is not breaking liberal norms in particular, but simply revising Deng’s vision to solve issues like corruption, something that was causing inefficiency within government (Minzner 2015, 142).
The recent resurgence in Chinese nationalism is another trend often brought up in discussions about China. The political history of Chinese nationalism in particular is nuanced and not comparable to western nationalism. China was a dominant force in Asia for much of its existence prior to the communist takeover, contributing 30 percent of the world’s GDP at one point (Economy 2018, 189). The years between the First Opium War and the defeat of Japan by allied forces are often referred to as the “century of humiliation” within China. In many ways, being dominated by the western powers and Japan is what drives forward nationalism today. Economy believes there is a psychological basis to this, citing Tsinghua University’s Yan Xuetong, who in 2001 argued “[Many Chinese citizens] believe China’s decline to be a historical mistake, which they should correct” (189). This way of looking at the history of China has undoubtedly centered nationalist attitudes around a return to global power status, and it is incredibly effective when used for political purposes. Xi has put special emphasis on building nationalism within young people, and the result is a generation of youth who are “more defensive than ever of China’s achievements.” (“Generation Xi” 2021, 7).
Key Issues and Questions
Observers should keep a close eye on approval ratings and other metrics gauging the support Chinese citizens have for their government. Since the rise of Deng, the Communist Party has consistently centered its actions around “performance legitimacy”. As long as China continues to improve conditions for the masses, China-watchers have little reason to believe a pro-democracy mass movement is on the horizon. If the state stops performing, however, a major threat to the party could develop rather quickly. Given the current pace of China’s poverty alleviation programs, I do not believe that the downfall of the Communist Party will be tied to a drop in legitimacy due to poor performance. It may be a contributing factor, but the party has created enough loyal supporters to withstand a drop in economic means to pursue such programs. This will likely be the case if, like the Russian Federation did during the simultaneous Crimea-related sanctions and drop in crude oil prices, China is willing and able to shift blame onto the west for causing the economic downturn. Sudden increases in anti-American sentiment found within the Chinese domestic media are a good signal to scan for, although context will need to be considered for each instance.
On a related note, it is unclear if Xi’s anti-corruption campaign will pass the test of time. There is no doubt that Xi has decreased the corruption that is in the public eye, but the systems that encourage corruption remain in place (Wright 2015, 189). Fundamentally, Xi has not made it more difficult to engage in corruption, just more likely a corrupt official will undergo party discipline if caught. Unless Xi proposes institutional reform to get rid of the corruption motive or the next leader of China is equally hard on corruption, I find it unlikely that the anti-corruption efforts will have a tangible impact on the next generation of party officials. If Xi’s efforts alone do manage to prove to decrease instances of corruption, it could make the party-state much more efficient in economic planning.
Another issue observers should pay attention to is the political direction taken by the party following Xi’s tenure. There are four paths authoritarian states can take as they develop: neo-totalitarianism, hard authoritarianism, soft authoritarianism, and semi-democracy (Shambaugh 2018, 5). Shambaugh argues that China is on the hard authoritarian path, adding that it is unlikely to change course in the near future, but that it must in order to avoid political and economic instability. Whether or not it is feasible for China to move to soft authoritarianism after Xi is unclear. There is a bit of resilience found within the perpetual motion of the Communist Party (Shambaugh 2018, 18), and this is consistent with the history of modern China. When Mao died, Deng emerged from the power vacuum and other party members certainly had opposition to his agenda. Nevertheless, Deng was able to push through reforms that “changed the course” of China onto one more associated with soft authoritarianism. Xi has shifted back to hard authoritarianism. Whether the next leader of China will shift paths to neo-totalitarianism or soft authoritarianism, if at all, is unclear.
Looking to the Future
Assessing the future of China is rather difficult, given how quickly factors have changed and will change in the coming years. In my research, I have run across two main perspectives scholars can be classified under: optimists and pessimists. Chaibong, an example of the former, suggests that China will soon follow the path of South Korea and be forced to undergo political liberalization in order to maintain economic growth and, by proxy, legitimacy (Chaibong 2018, 178). I disagree with Chaibong’s analysis here; it’s clear China is unique in its authoritarian style because of the legacy of Deng Xiaoping, and therefore Chinese development cannot be compared to Korea’s. Deng saw democracy as a threat, although he acknowledged the historical link between economic liberalization and political reform, and this significantly dampened the magnitude of feasible reforms (Pei 2019, 151). This has proven that it is possible for China to modernize and adapt without needing to undergo significant political reform. Unlike Pei, however, I don’t view this display of resilience as an inherent negative.
Instead, I argue that China’s resilience is something that works in the regime’s favor, making western notions of liberalization irrelevant altogether. The ability of the Communist Party to “cross the river by feeling the stones” is perhaps the thing that strengthens public support of the party. Of course, reforms coming from this process of experimentation will never lead to a liberal democracy (or semi-democracy like Singapore), but it does allow the citizens of China to feel like their needs are being intentionally met by their government. Wright also rests outside of this optimist-pessimist spectrum, noting that there is hardly any need to introduce aspects of liberal democracy into the upper levels of the Chinese political system (Wright 2015, 195). Doing so would uproot the concept of performance legitimacy, which is what forces the Communist Party to be responsive to the needs of citizens.
I find the future of China is dependent on the successor to Xi. Xi, despite his growing cult of personality, has served to correct the trajectory of reform-era leaders, just as Deng served to correct the disastrous trajectory of Mao. If Xi’s successor falls in line with the current central committee, I believe China will continue on the same path of growth and success, at least at home. There will still be issues that need to be addressed in order to maintain legitimacy, however. For one, the economy must continue to grow, at least at the rate of inflation, as China shifts to a domestic economy. The Communist Party must also bring back the mechanisms for people to voice discontent which were dissolved during the Xi era. Both of these seem like reachable goals given the growth of the Chinese economy during the COVID-19 pandemic. But if Xi’s successor tries to correct Xi’s successful programs, such as the anti-corruption campaigns and the emphasis on party loyalty, they would undo the social infrastructure that has allowed China to maintain performance legitimacy.
